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Abstract
In this paper we experimentally test Schelling’s (1971) segregation model and obtain
the striking result of full segregation in most of the cases. In addition, we extend
Schelling’s model theoretically by adding strategic behaviour and moving costs. We
obtain a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which rational agents facing moving
costs may find it optimal not to move (anticipating other participants’ movements).
This equilibrium is far from full segregation. We run experiments for this extended
Schelling model, and find that the percentage of full segregated societies is notably
reduced when the cost of moving is high, but it is not affected when it is low, relative
to the baseline with costless moving. We also find that the degree of segregation
depends on the distribution of strategic subjects relative of a baseline model where
moving is costless.
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1. Introduction
Segregation is a relevant economic, political and social problem all around the world,
as it enhances marginalization, poverty, illiteracy, etc. Examples such as favelas in
Brasil or red districts at Pattaya and Chonburi (Thailand) do not need further
explanations.1
Individuals with similar ideas, habits, preferences, political affiliations or from the
same ethnic group tend to join together and create cliques and clusters in commu-
nities, which result in segregation at the society scale. Thomas C. Schelling (1971)
provided the first model of spatial segregation. He showed that even individuals
with very low mixing aversion may cause a segregated society in dynamic environ-
ments.2
Segregation can be the result of individual preferences but also the maximizing social
welfare configuration. In other words, an equilibrium configuration can exhibit high
levels of segregation, although there are not individuals’ preferences for segregation
per se. This phenomenon illustrates unintended consequences resulting from the
interaction between individuals.
The basic prediction of Schelling’s model is that under some general conditions it
is nearly impossible to fight against a high level of segregation3. With individuals
acting in their own self interest we have a socially suboptimal configuration.
This paper provides a new and more optimistic result. When subjects are com-
pletely rational and moving is costly then the full segregated configuration is not an
equilibrium.
1Programs such us “Moving to the Opportunity” indicate how strong is the social concern about
segregation in the U.S. (for more references see Kling, Liebman and Katz, 2007).
2Schelling defined a model in which agents, divided into two types, move on a checkerboard
according to a given utility function. Within this set up, Schelling shows that segregation occurs
even when individuals have very mild preferences for neighbours of their type, as long as they are
allowed to move in order to satisfy their preferences.
3The Schelling segregation benchmark consists of a spatial model in which agents of two well-
differentiated types distribute along a line with preferences that depend on the composition of their
surrounding neighbourhoods. In this model there are no objective neighbourhood boundaries; in-
dividuals define their neighbourhood with respect to their location. An individual moves if she is
not content with the type mixture of her neighbourhood, moving to a place where the mixture of
individuals meets her tolerance level, which is defined as the proportion of individuals of differ-
ent types in her neighbourhood. Schelling’s seminal model strikingly predicts a high segregation
outcome from the initial situation when agents are myopic and can move costlessly.
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How can we get this result? Individuals in the Schelling model are myopic. We
consider as myopic agents those individuals who move according to the Schelling
specific rule: individuals move whenever they are not content. So, they do not com-
pute too much and they just respond instinctively (see Rubinstein, 2007). However,
in our model we check whether the dynamics of the model change when we do not
assume such non–elaborated reasoning. Surprisingly, when we model the Schelling
dynamics using strategic –instead of myopic players– we obtain an unexpected re-
sult: we do find that less segregated outcomes, than the ones predicted by Schelling,
are also equilibria. Hence, under rationality, the full segregated society is not the
unique equilibrium.
Theoretically it would be highly desirable to find an environment in which society
members’ incentives are aligned around a unique equilibrium. This problem is al-
ready solved when we introduce costly moving.4 We find that the introduction of
any positive cost in the strategic model solves the multiple equilibria problem. This
equilibrium with moving costs constitutes our first result.
The introduction of moving costs makes the model closer to reality, where the costs
of moving play a crucial role on individuals’ decisions,5 and solves the theoretical
problem aforementioned.
The second contribution of this paper is experimental. We design an experiment to
unravel how individuals play when moving is costly. We use a one-shot game where
8 subjects are randomly placed (face-to-face) around a real circle describing an un-
happy society configuration: black, white, black, white, etc. We call a configuration
in which at least one individual may improve her happiness by changing her location
an unhappy society. In our setting subjects are given the chance to move or stay
in order to reach the maximum level of happiness in the form of a fixed monetary
payoff.
With the spirit of capturing the real decision of moving we introduce low and high
moving costs. We compare this with the baseline model of no costs.
Our experimental data show that the Schelling outcome does not always emerge,
4The assumption of free moving in the original model is restricted to minimal movement (the
nearest place). Therefore, Schelling is assuming that, in certain sense, moving is not completely
costless.
5Individuals are utility maximizers, and they may be indifferent to several actions if they get the
same payoff. However, the existence of costs that may reduce their benefits may make them to be-
have more strategically. Therefore, strategic agents facing moving costs may anticipate subsequent
movements by other participants, finding it optimal not to move.
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especially if there are moving costs. The existence of moving costs fosters the ap-
pearance of individuals behaving strategically. Therefore, we also show that strate-
gic behaviour is not rare but, on the contrary, quite abundant in treatments with
moving costs. And most importantly, the fully segregated outcome vanishes in the
presence of strategic players.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The related literature is presented
in section 2. Section 3 is divided into three subsections. In the first subsection
we recall the classic Schelling linear model, in the second subsection we present
our extensive Schelling dynamic game and, finally, we introduce two definitions of
individual behaviour in the third subsection. The experimental design is explained
in section 4, results are presented in section 5, and section 6 concludes.
2. Related Literature
Using one and two-dimensional landscapes, Schelling (1969, 1971) showed the emer-
gence of high segregation even if individuals in the society had mild preferences
for living with neighbours of their own type. Schelling’s result is, in general, of
interest to economists, policy makers and social scientists because it illustrates the
emergence of an aggregated phenomenon that cannot be directly foreseen from in-
dividual behaviour and concerns an important problem: segregation. This striking
result has generated a vast amount of literature from a wide range of scientific
trends. Miltaich and Winter (2002), assuming that individual’s characteristics are
unidimensional, find a stable partition that not only is stable but also segregat-
ing. Likewise, Karni and Schneidler (1990) examine the conditions for segregation
and group formation in an overlapping generations model. On the other hand, the
seminal concept of stochastic stability introduced by Foster and Young (1990), and
developed within the evolutionary game theory literature, provides generations in-
sight into Schelling’s spatial proximity model. Young (1998, 2001) presents a simple
variation of the one-dimensional Schelling model, showing that segregation tends to
emerge in the long run, even though a segregated neighbourhood is not preferred
by any agent. Zhang (2004) extends Young’s set-up (1998) into a two-dimensional
framework. Both studies argue that complete segregation is the only viable long-run
outcome for best-response dynamics if the agents’ preferences are biased in favor of
their own type. Pancs and Vriend (2007) also find that complete segregation is the
only possible long-run outcome in a ring where agents have balanced preferences
about the racial composition of their neighbourhood. Although the analytical result
in Pancs and Vriend (2007) cannot be extended to a two-dimensional society setting,
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they show, through simulations, that best-response dynamics also tend to produce
segregation even in a two-dimensional space.
In summary, this branch of the literature shows that even if all individual agents
have a strict preference for perfect integration, myopic best-response dynamics may
lead to segregation6. This finding casts some doubts on the design (ability) of public
policies to improve integration by promoting openness and tolerance with respect
to diversity.
On the empirical side, many studies on racial segregation analyze discrimination in
housing prices. Specifically, studies from the 1960s, such as King and Mieszkowski
(1973), tend to find evidence that African-Americans pay more for equivalent hous-
ing. However, studies from the 1970s, such as Follain and Malpezzie (1981), do not
confirm this evidence. Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor (1999) confirm that the African-
American rent premium fell dramatically between 1940 and 1970 and had reversed
entirely by 1990.
Another branch of the empirical literature explains segregation through social inter-
action models. In this literature, the concept of tipping7 is crucial for understanding
the dynamics of segregation. In particular, segregation emerges and persists pre-
cisely because such residential patterns resist tipping. Clark and Fossett (2007)
provide simulation experimental results crafted to explore the implications of eth-
nic preferences in multi-group situations. They establish that ignoring the role of
choice behaviour based on own-race preferences is akin to omitting the potentially
important influence of racial and ethnic dynamics in residential composition. Using
regression discontinuity methods and Census tract data from 1970 through 2000,
Card, Mas and Rothstein (2008) find strong evidence that white population flows
exhibit tipping-like behaviour in most cities of the U.S. This result is consistent with
that of Cutler, Glaeser and Vidgor (1999) and Card, Mas and Rothestein (2008),
who find that tipping points are significantly higher in cities with higher minority
shares.
In sum, the empirical evidence also points to the existence of high segregation even
when agent preferences depend on individual choices and every agent prefers to live
in a mixed-race neighbourhood.
6In the above literature, the main assumption about individual behaviour is that individuals
do not behave rationally.
7Tipping is said to occur when some recognizable minority group in a neighbourhood reaches a
size that motivates other residents to leave.
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3. Theory
Schelling’s (1969, 1971) linear model considers a finite number of individuals dis-
tributed along a line where the individuals are of black or white types.8 All mem-
bers of the population are assumed to care about the individuals’ typology they live
with, i.e., their neighbourhood. Everyone is able to move to another location if she
is dissatisfied with the type mixture she lives in. Specifically, each agent defines her
neighbourhood as the d > 0 individuals on either side of her own location. Therefore
each agent’s neighbourhood is composed of her 2d adjacent neighbours. Schelling
assumed that every agent prefers to have at least m ∈ {1, . . . , 2d} neighbours of her
same type. We call m the individual’s tolerance level9, which represents a threshold
over the composition of each agent’s neighbourhood. Therefore agents’ preferences
over their neighbourhoods are defined over the parameters d and m. Through these
parameters we can determine whether an individual is happy (if the number of neigh-
bours like her is larger than or equal to m) or unhappy (if the number of neighbours
like her is smaller than m).10
Unhappy agents move in turns, should they still be unhappy when their turn comes,
starting from the left to the nearest place that fulfills their neighbourhood configu-
ration demand. Schelling defined nearest place as the point reached by surpassing
the smallest number of neighbours on the way. In those cases in which an agent has
two nearest places at the same distance (one in each side), the choice is arbitrary.
In this setting it is assumed that moving is costless.
Whenever one agent moves, two different situations may arise. First, someone who
was happy may become unhappy because like members move out from her neigh-
bourhood (or opposite members move in). Second, those who were initially unhappy
are now happy as opposite neighbours move away (or like neighbours move nearby).
Moreover, the Schelling rule holds that, in each round, any initially unhappy member
who is happy when her turn comes will not move. Likewise, anyone who becomes
discontent in the previous round will have her turn after all initially discontents
have had their innings. This process stops when no agent wants to move anymore
or continue ad infinitum.
8In the one-dimensional model, Schelling (1971) also refers to the possibility of considering an
infinitely continuing line or a ring.
9Young (2009) referred to this concept as the agent i’s social threshold.
10The parameters d and m allow to examine different examples as set out in Schelling (1971),
where different neighbourhood sizes may have some different requirements (for example, if we have
a neighbourhood composed by four neighbours we want at least one like us, if it is composed by
six we want at least two, ...).
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Note that, in the Schelling setting nobody anticipates the movements of others. That
is, when their turn to move comes, individuals move if their neighbourhood demands
are not met,11 and the typical outcome is a highly segregated society. The dynamics
in Schelling’s model can be defined as an iterative and sequential process of agents
choosing myopic responses, where the only restriction to the mobility of agents is to
go to the nearest place.
3.1. Schelling’s linear model
Let us consider a very simple case to understand the apparently simple dynamics
of Schelling’s linear model. Suppose that a society is composed of 8 individuals
of two types, of which four are blacks (B) and four are whites (W). Assume that
these individuals are distributed along a ring –that is, a society– with the following
configuration:
{B,W,B,W,B,W,B,W} (1)
Let us denote the individuals as their location on (1) starting from left to right.
Hence, agent 1 is the top black bullet, agent 2 is the next white bullet and so on
until agent 8, who will be the last white bullet. This configuration is represented as
a connected ring in Figure 1.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Figure 1: A particular initial configuration of four type B individuals and four type W individuals.
Furthermore, let’s suppose that each individual in configuration (1) accepts up to
11This coincides with our definition of a myopic player.
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50% of unlike neighbours12 over a neighbourhood composed of one individual at
each side (d = 1). Notice that no player is happy in the initial configuration of the
society and therefore everybody is willing to move. Let’s see now how Schelling’s
dynamics work.
The first unhappy individual is agent 1, who is not satisfied with her neighbourhood
configuration. She may move to two satisfactory positions: either the position
between agents 2 and 3 or the position between agents 7 and 8. As stated before,
we solve this symmetric case by moving agent 1 to the right. That is, agent 1
moves between agents 2 and 3 (Figure 2(a) below). After makes this move agent 1,
agents 2, 3 and 8 become happy. Therefore the next unhappy agent in the ring is
individual 4. This agent will move to the location between 5 and 6 (Figure 2(b)),
thereby making agents 5 and 6 happy. The next unhappy agent, and in this case
the last one, is agent 7. Agent 7 will move to the position between agents 2 and 1,
as it is the nearest position to the right that fulfills her preferences (Figure 2(c)).
Notice that although individuals 2, 3, 5, 6, and 8 were initially unhappy, they do
not move because they were happy when their turns to move came. This process
ends at this stage because all individuals are happy, and no one wants to move
to another location (Figure 2(d)). Thus, the society ends up in a situation of full
segregation.
STAGE 0 STAGE 0 STAGE 0 STAGE 1
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
8
7
6
5
4
3
1
2
8
7
6
4
5
3
1
2
2
8
6
4
5
3
1
7
(a) (b) (d)(c)
Figure 2: Figures (a), (b), (c) and (d) illustrate the dynamics of Schelling’s myopic response over
the particular case of Figure 1.
12As in the original Schelling model. Schelling (1969, 1971) also considers the possibility that
agents accept up to other percentages of unlike neighbours.
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3.2. Schelling model with fully rational players
Now, we study the impact of strategic behaviour in the Schelling’s linear model
under two scenarios: without and with moving costs. Let’s start with the model
without moving costs.
Each player i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} has two possible actions: either “to stay” at her initial
location denoted by i or “to move” to the nearest space with a neighbour of her same
type denoted by i¯. Each player prefers to be close to at least one like neighbour.
Given these preferences, we translate the agent’s preferences into a utility function
that depends on, the individual’s actions and the final configuration of the society.
In particular, the payoff for every player is defined as a positive value, M , if the
agent ends up with at least one neighbour like her. Recall that in the Schelling’s
model there exists a moving order for each unhappy player. The first unhappy
player moves, then the second agent faces the same decision and so on until the last
unhappy agent. The dynamic structure described above could be modeled as an
extensive game where the players play sequentially. In such a setting, each agent
takes her best-response action. That is, one player could find it optimal either “to
stay”, because she anticipates that the actions of the other players would generate
a final configuration where she will become happy, or “to move”, otherwise. Both
actions are allowed in our model, and an unhappy player does not necessarily have
to move. Moreover, given the payoff structure of the game the behaviour of player
i will explicitly depend on both d and m.
This explicit scenario, seen as a sequential game, is denoted by Γn0 . The proper
equilibrium notion for the above dynamic scenario is the subgame perfect equilib-
rium (SPE henceforth). The equilibrium strategies should specify optimal behaviour
from any information node up to the end of the game. That is, any agent’s strat-
egy should assign what is optimal from that node onwards, given her opponents’
strategies.
When there are no moving costs, any final configuration where any individual is
happy may be implemented by different sequences of actions and all of then are
equilibria. For instance, for d = m = 1, the sequence of actions explained in the
above subsection (where player 1, 4 and 7 move and the remainder players stay) is
an equilibrium path. But there are more possibilities, for instance a situation where
player 2 moves between 4 and 5 and player 6 moves between 7 and 8 is as well an
equilibrium. In this case, the final configuration B,B,W,W,B,B,W,W is a happy
society since every player ends with at least a neighbour like her.
The following lemma asserts the existence of pure equilibria in Γn0 for all d,m.
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Notice that when n is small and there are not enough agents of one type to satisfy
the happiness condition, then there is not a happy final configuration and to stay
is the best strategy for these agents. Notice that the game Γn0 is a finite extensive
game under complete information, hence there are pure equilibria13. The formal
presentation of the game is in Appendix A.
Lemma 1. Let m, d, n ∈ N such that 0 ≤ m ≤ 2d and n ≥ 2(m+ 1). The game Γn0
with players of each type (at least m) has equilibria in pure strategies.
Next subsection illustrates how positive costs have an impact on the set of equilibria.
Actually, a strong refinement is achieved for d = m = 1 for a particular initial
society.
3.3. Fully rational players and moving costs
We extend the game by introducing moving costs, C > 0, to modify the value of the
payoff function. Thus, if at the very end of the game player i is happy, she earns
the payoff M if she has moved or the payoff M + C if she has not moved. If she
ends up in an unhappy situation, she gets 0 or C if her action was “to move” or “to
stay”, respectively. We assume that M > C > 0.
As the setting without moving costs, we can see this explicit scenario as a sequen-
tial game that we denote by Γn. We can study the SPE and the corresponding
equilibrium strategies which will depend on both d and m.
Consider first the following case: let {B,W,B,W,B,W,B,W} be an initial configura-
tion. If d = m = 2 such a configuration will be a happy configuration since all their
individuals have two neighbours (with distance equal to 2) like her. Nevertheless, if
d = m = 1 then the same configuration is totally unhappy since any individual has
only one neighbour like her. Therefore, the same configuration can be considered
either happy or unhappy depending on the specific tolerance level.
Schelling establishes a behaviour when a player is happy and when she is not.
Namely, if an individual is unhappy she will move to the nearest place where she
becomes happy. Nevertheless, if she is happy she will stay at the same location.
Actually, the movement of distance zero is the nearest place where she is (already)
happy. Under strategic consideration we may find all the possible responses, condi-
tional on the tolerance level. Let us see some examples to understand the scope of
13This lemma does not provide a characterization of the final configuration attending any initial
configuration and conditions on d,m since this is a well recognized complex problem.
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strategic individual behaviour.
Consider a history of length 6 generating the following configuration {W,W,B,W,B,W,B,B}
from the initial configuration {W,W,B,B,W,W,B,B} with d = m = 2. The game
is at one node where player 7 with type B is called upon to play. She has one
neighbour like her with distance two to the left and another one with distance one
to the right. Therefore, she is already happy. Schelling would declare “to stay” as
the action played by player 7. But would player 7 play “to stay” if player 8 were
rational?
Suppose that player 7 follows the behaviour predicted by Schelling, i.e., she does
not move. Then, the best response for player 8 is “to move” since player 8 is at
the last stage of the game and she is still unhappy. The final configuration would
be {W,W,B,B,W,B,W,B} being the last one player 7. It is easy to compute that
player 7 would finish being unhappy. Nevertheless, if player 7 anticipates the best
choice that player 8 will choose, then player 7 could see that by moving between
player 1 and 2 the next configuration would be {W,B,W,B,W,B,W,B}. In this
configuration player 8 is the last B and player 7 is at position 2. Both players have
two neighbours like them at distance two. In the last stage player 8 has no incentive
to move and this would be the end of the game.14
Suppose now that d = m = 1 and the initial configuration is {B,W,B,W,B,W,B,W}.
• If a player i is already happy when she is called upon to play, then happiness
only comes from the previous movements of players 1, 2, . . . i− 1). Notice that
the next neighbour i + 1 has a different type than i. In this case, the best
response is always “to stay”.
• If i is unhappy when she is called upon to play, then she has to compute her
best response in the corresponding subgame. She has to check whether to stay
or to move is her best response.
For instance, suppose that h5 = (1, 2, 3, 4¯, 5) is the history for player 6 at node s. As
player 6 is already happy when she is called upon to play, since player 4 has moved
close to her, then, her best response is “to stay”, 6, and her payoff would be M +C,
given that she did not pay any moving cost.
14This case illustrates that within our framework, strategic behaviour and moving costs, a happy
player may have incentives to move should she anticipate an agent playing after her will move
leaving her in an unhappy position. Therefore, a positive cost does not necessarily imply a reduction
of movements.
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Suppose now that player 6 is at node s after the new history h
′
5 = (1, 2, 3¯, 4, 5). In
this case, player 6 is unhappy. Is “to stay” the best response for her? As the action
to move results in a lower payoff for any final situation, let’s calculate if 6 is the best
response for player 6.
According to the definition of subgame perfection, it is necessary to find the best
response for players 7 and 8 at the corresponding subgame denoted by Γh5 . Let’s
start by studying the best response for player 8:
• Suppose that player 7 moves. Player 8 is then happy since player 6 is in her
neighbourhood. Therefore the best response for player 8 is “to stay”.
• Suppose that player 7 does not move. Then the best response for player 8
given the history (1, 2, 3, 4¯, 5, 6, 7) is “to move” since player 8 is at the last
stage of the game and she is still unhappy.
Now consider the best response of player 7 given the above best response for player
8.
• If player 7 is happy, then her best response is obviously “to stay”.
• If player 7 is unhappy, taking into account the best strategy for player 8,
the corresponding best response will be “to stay” since it guarantees her the
maximum payoff (M + C).
Consequently, as player 7 will not move if agent 6 plays “to stay”, she will end
up unhappy. Hence, her best response is “to move”, thus guaranteeing a happy
position.
The above argument can be carried out at any (information) node for each player
generating the SPE. In the previous examples, any configuration with any tolerance
level generates an extensive game with the common property of no indifference con-
dition at any information node.15 Moreover, if there are enough players to guarantee
the happiness condition for any type then the final configuration is a happy soci-
ety. This entails that the full rationality assumption supports a one-round extensive
game. Namely, players only need to play once to reach happiness in contrast to the
Schelling dynamics that may be infinite.
The following theorem states the existence of a unique SPE for Γn for any tolerance
level. Moreover, the case of d = m = 1 for the initial configuration (B,W,B,W,B,W,
B,W ) is studied. This instance is the simplest one that collects the main features
15Note that the game Γ is a generic game.
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to properly discriminate between strategic versus myopic behaviour. Furthermore,
the equilibrium path that arises from the unique SPE does not generate a com-
pletely segregated configuration in contrast to the fully segregated outcome reached
in Schelling’s model.
Theorem 1. • There exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the exten-
sive game Γn.
• For d = m = 1 and the initial configuration {B,W,B,W,B,W,B,W}, the
final configuration {B,B,W,W,B,B,W,W} is the consequence of the unique
equilibrium path (1, 2, 3, 4¯, 5, 6, 7, 8¯).
The proof is in the Appendix.
The configuration reached by strategic players playing the SPE for a initial config-
uration {B,W,B,W,B,W,B,W} and d = m = 1 has two remarkable properties.
On the one hand, any player is happy at the end of the sequential game and, on the
other hand, half of the players decide to stay, thus avoiding the moving cost. We
call this final configuration {B,B,W,W,B,B,W,W} a happy-non-segregated (HNS
henceforth) society. We should point out that this is the only happy configuration
when there are moving costs.
3.4. Summary
Schelling provided an early contribution, proposing a model to formalize the ag-
gregate consequences of individual preferences related to the social environment
(Schelling, 1969, 1971). The basic components of Schelling’s Dynamic models of
segregation (1971) are an individual utility function that entirely determines the
level of satisfaction enjoyed by an agent in a location, and a dynamic rule that
drives agents’ location changes and, therefore, the way the configuration of the city
evolves. All this without cost of movement. Using an inductive approach, Schelling
shows that if the preferences considered are such that an environment of more than
50% of like-group agents is highly preferred to an environment of less than 50%, then
the equilibrium configuration exhibits high levels of segregation, although there is
no preference for segregation per se. Schelling’s (1971) paper is a seminal work in
relation to his seemingly paradoxical finding that mild individual preferences for
own-group neighbours lead to complete segregation at the global level.
However, on reflection, we realize that, given equal payments between being myopic
and not (as in Schelling’s model, 1971), the final configuration of the society would
hardly be an integrated environment. The introduction of the costs of moving in
our setting discriminates between myopic individuals and those who are not, making
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it possible to achieve more integrated societies. Since real societies are comprised
by heterogeneous individuals, our model can be seen as an extension of Schelling’s
model, illustrating how heterogeneous individuals can reach both segregated envi-
ronments and not segregated ones.
Our theoretical contribution is focused on this specific case and it is not necessarily
generalizable to any other environment. However, as we will see below, this theoret-
ical set up provides the appropriate framework to explore subject’s decisions.
4. Experimental evidence
This section describes the design of the experiments carried out to test: first, the
existence of fully rational strategic players; and, second, how their behaviour affects
the Schelling segregation result.
It is important to stress that the aim of this section is not proving that subjects
play the SPE. We do not expect subjects will play in such a complex way. The aim
of our experimental research is to check whether subjects use simple (myopic) or
sophisticated (strategic) decision rules, and if the use of those rules by agents affects
the final distribution achieved relative to the costless setting.
This section is divided in four subsections. First, we present the experimental design
and some details about the implementation and the replication in the lab. Second,
we properly define what is strategic and myopic behaviour in the specific game
presented in the theoretical section. The third subsection is devoted to explain the
results. A final subsection discusses our results.
4.1. Experimental design
We start with an experiment of the linear Schelling model without moving costs
(baseline) and then provide an experiment of our extensive game with positive –low
and high– moving costs (see section 3.3). The game played here shares some fea-
tures with Benito et al. (2011), that analyzes the role of sequential and simultaneous
moving in a Schelling experimental game without moving costs for 8 subjects. That
paper compares the number of steps a society requires to reach the Nash equilib-
ria. Although the theoretical prediction is that sequential movement requires less
iterations than simultaneous movement (since information is higher in the later) the
results are quite unexpected: In societies with simultaneous movement, we observe
faster convergence or, in the worst case, we find no difference between sequential and
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simultaneous moving. Benito et al. (2011) extends the analysis to costly simulta-
neous moving, showing that the existence of positive costs make subjects less likely
to move and, consequently, the convergence process is notably slowed down. It is
crucial to note that Benito et al. (2011) does not provides any theoretical framework
to analyze individual decision making.
4.1.1. A face-to-face Schelling ring experiment
Moving is a key ingredient of the Schelling model. Subjects choices are restricted
either “to move” or “to stay”. In our game, in an attempt to maintain the essence
of individual choice, subjects physically move across a ring. We consider that a
face-to-face experiment might better capture the features an individual takes into
account when she decides to move. We are aware that anonymity is at risk in this
environment. Therefore, to check whether there is any effect related to this issue we
also run complementary computerized lab experiments (see section 4.1.4.).
We organize individuals in groups of eight around a circle, measuring 11.5 feet in
diameter (see Figure 3). To allocate the individuals in each circle, we follow a
random sorting scheme where the first individual is assigned the black type, the
second individual the white type, and so on16, that is {B,W,B,W,B,W,B,W}.
Each subjects’ type is easily identifiable by a black/white scarf.
W W
W
W
B
B
B
B
Figure 3: Circle configuration
16The experiment was conducted in Spain where the labels “black” and ‘white” are meaningless.
Therefore there is no reason to be aware of potential framing.
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According to Schelling, players obtain positive utility if they reach a happy position
(i.e., a player has at least one neighbour of her type). We capture the individual’s
utility function through a fixed prize that might be earned if a subject ends up with
a like neighbour. Notice that in the initial configuration nobody is happy. Therefore,
subjects have the opportunity “to stay” or “to move” from their location when their
turn comes. Thus, subject 1 might decide to stay or to move {1, 1}; after subject 1
has taken her decision, subject 2 (to the left of subject 1) faces an identical decision
problem {2, 2}; then, subject 3, etc.
Individuals played the game five times. In each round, a random device places sub-
jects in new positions (and therefore the color of their scarves changes accordingly).
In the experiment, we use the following payoff scheme:
• players would be paid in one out of the 5 games (randomly selecting that
game);
• two out of the eight subjects (we select that game randomly) would be paid;
and,
• the prize would be 50 Euros for the happy subjects selected.
In summary, two out of the eight participants would be randomly selected to be
paid 0 Euros if they end up being unhappy and 50 Euros otherwise.
4.1.2. Face-to-face and costly Schelling treatments
To implement the extensive Schelling dynamic game, we add moving costs to the
above experiment. In particular, we run two treatments with moving costs:
T1: 5-Euros moving (low costs).
T2: 20-Euros moving (high costs).
We introduce the costs in the experiment in an easy way. We place the money on
the floor in front of each subject and they are informed that, should they move they
will lose this (potential) money. The analogy with real life costs is quite obvious:
you leave your home or friends behind when you move. That is, all subjects can see
a 5-Euros [20-Euros] bill at their feet. Consequently, if they move, they lose the 5
[20] Euros.
As before, two out of the eight participants are randomly selected to be paid. There-
fore, in the extensive game:
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• An individual might earn 0 Euros if she ends up unhappy and has moved or 5
(20) Euros if she ends up unhappy and has not moved.
• If she ends up with a neighbour like her she might earn 50 Euros (if she has
moved) or 50 plus 5 (20) Euros if she ends up with a neighbour like her and
has not moved.
In addition to the 5 rounds (identical to the baseline with the only difference of the
costs) we run another additional 5 rounds.17
4.1.3. Implementation
The experiment was ran at the School of Economics of the University of Granada
(Spain) on April 20, 2009.
In particular, we ran 6 sessions or societies for each treatment (low and high costs)
with 8 subjects in each society. Further, we run 5 sessions with 8 subjects for the
baseline (no moving costs). Overall, we had a total of 136 participants (8 subjects
×6 societies+8 × 6 + 8 × 5). These participants were randomly recruited from a
sample of 191 subjects who had signed up to participate in the experiment.18
All the experimental sessions were conducted the same day and at the same time.
Experimental subjects were randomly assigned to each ring and they stayed in the
same ring during the whole experiment. Seventeen associate professors, teaching
assistants and Ph.D. students (working in experimental economics) acted as moni-
tors to conduct the sessions. The monitors received identical training and had the
same instructions booklet19 (including random assignments for each round, payoffs
scheme, etc.).
As explained before, the baseline treatment, c = 0, was repeated 5 times, therefore
it provides information about 5 × 5 societies or 5 × 5 × 8 individual data (200
observations). For treatments with costs, c = 5 and c = 20, we repeated the
experiment after a surprise re-start, and therefore we have information about (5 ×
6)× 2 societies or (5× 6× 8)× 2 (480 observations) in both treatments.
17We repeated the game in order to increase the number of observations in our analysis. This
repetition is done using a surprise restart. We do not change the rules or any other aspect of the
game. Players have the chance to double their earnings as we pay one participant in one of the 5
rounds of the 2 sessions. Our results indicate that there is not any impact on the results (between
the two sessions) and therefore we pool the data across the 2 sessions (10 rounds).
18In the following we will use the term society to refer to clocks.
19A copy of the instructions booklet is available upon request.
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Due to unintended errors by the monitors we missed some data: i) one of the
monitors in c = 20 did not run the repetition; ii) two societies in c = 20 were
impossible to be read due to a large number of crossing out and erasures. As a
result we lost some observations. Table 1 shows the number of experimental data
per treatment (where the last two columns reflect the real data we use once we
exclude the missing values).
The complete experiment lasted 1 hour and the average earning was 30 Euros. Before
starting the real game, subjects played two trial runs to ensure that they understood
the structure of the game.
Two important features stand out in our design:
1. The randomization sorting in each round allows us to obtain different types of
actions for any given subject: i.e., first mover, second mover and so on.
2. This within-subject analysis enables us to explore how experience may alter
subjects’ willingness to play more strategically.
Table 1: Summary of treatments & observations (face–to–face)
sessions rounds repetitions societies obs. societies (real) obs. (real)
c = 0 5 5 0 25 200 25 200
c = 5 6 5 1 60 480 60 480
c = 20 6 5 1 60 480 53 424
Note: ”obs.” is the number of observations
4.1.4. A non face-to-face Schelling ring experiment
As economic incentives, anonymity is a crucial feature of experimental economics.
Our face-to-face set-up clearly fails in this respect. To check the robustness of our
results we ran a number of additional treatments with standard lab conditions. We
ran a number of computerized sessions at the LINEEX experimental laboratory of
the University of Valencia (Spain) on February, 2010. All of them played 10 rounds
with identical instructions to the face-to-face experiment.
• 40 subjects participated in the baseline treatment (zero costs),
• 48 subjects participated in the low cost treatment,
• 48 played the high-cost treatment.
A summary of these treatments is shown in Table 2.
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Table 2: Summary of treatments & observations (replications)
sessions rounds repetitions societies observations
c = 0 5 5 0 25 200
c = 5 6 5 1 60 480
c = 20 6 5 1 60 480
4.2. Myopic and strategic behaviour
Before starting with the analysis of the data we obtained from the experiments,
we precisely explain under which circumstances “to stay” or “to move” has a clear
meaning. The above Theorem holds that there are four types of behaviour in equi-
librium. We describe these types in what follows.
The first one, Type I, is the behaviour followed by players 5 and 6. Given the history
(1, 2, 3, 4¯), players 5 and 6 are already happy as a result of player 4’s action. We
can say that their best response, “to stay”, is equivalent to what they would have
done in the Schelling framework. In other words, both players 5 and 6 would play
the same action, regardless of whether they were playing a myopic response or the
SPE response. In both cases, they stay in their initial position. Therefore, in cases
where players do not need to move it is not possible to distinguish whether they are
playing the linear Schelling model or the sequential Schelling dynamics model.
The second type of behaviour is performed by players 1, 2, 3, and 7. When these
agents are called upon to play, no one is happy, but their best response is “to
stay”. Such behaviour implies that they have computed the best response to their
associated subgame.20 Notice that in all of these nodes players play differently than
when they act as myopic players. We call such behaviour Type II behaviour.
The third behaviour could appear in opposition to the above strategic behaviour. For
instance, if player 7 played “to move” she would get a positive payoff M because she
ends up in a happy configuration. Nevertheless, such behaviour implies that player
7 did not compute her best response, taking into account the best response of player
8. We call such behaviour “myopic behaviour” or Type III behaviour.
Finally, we have Type IV individuals: players 4 and 8. Both players are unhappy
and they decide “to move” in contrast with the above set of players {1, 2, 3, 7}.
This is so because their best action is “to move”. In other words, should player 4
20The action “to stay” in such situations conveys a non-trivial computation.
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decide “to stay”, the best response by the rest of the players would never generate
a configuration with player 4 in a happy situation.
The four types described above are summarized in Table 3:
Table 3: Subject types
Type Initial Best-Response Myopic Action
I Happy Stay Stay Stay
II Unhappy Stay Move Stay
III Unhappy Stay Move Move
IV Unhappy Move Move Move
Although all players play their best response in equilibrium, we specially distinguish
the set of Type II players ({1, 2, 3, 7}), that we call strategic players. We emphasize
that the action “to stay” played by unhappy players demonstrates21 the ability to
compute the best response in the current subgame.
Formally,
Definition 1 (Type II, unhappy-strategic): Given history h, we define as strate-
gic behaviour those unhappy i who play their best-response “to stay” in Γh.
Definition 2 (Type III, unhappy-myopic): Given history h, we define as my-
opic behaviour those unhappy i who play “to move” instead of their best-
response “to stay” in Γh.
We should emphasize that there may exist another type of behaviour. Irrational
subjects may choose to move in a situation in which they are already happy (not-
Type I) or subjects who being not happy choose “to stay” when they do not have
any chance of being happy unless they move22 (not-Type IV). Formally,
Definition 3 (Type ¬ I and ¬ IV): Given history h, we define as irrational be-
haviour those happy (unhappy) i who play “to move” (“to stay”) when both
their myopic and best response is “to stay” (“to move”) in Γh.
Let us now focus on how the emergence of unhappy-strategic (Type II) versus
unhappy-myopic (Type III) behaviour may affect the final outcome configuration.
21Theoretically, the rule of thumb “never move” could also explain the behaviour of Type II
individuals in our study. However, we exclude this explanation as in our experiment we do not
find any individual following that rule.
22An individual follows the rule of thumb “never move” if she is categorized as Type II and not-
Type IV at the same time. We do not find subjects fulfilling both conditions in our experiment.
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We have characterized all possible histories of length i−1 such that player i faces the
above dilemma: strategic versus myopic response. At each possible decision node
of the above family of histories, agent i should play “to stay” as her best response
and therefore player i declares herself to be Type II, unhappy-strategic. However,
we also consider the other action, “to move”, where player i reveals herself to be
Type III, unhappy-myopic. We can distinguish between both types since there is
a one-to-one correspondence between actions and types, Types II and III, for the
above family of histories. We assume that regardless of the action taken by player
i, the remaining players (i+ 1, . . . , 8) play their subgame best response. A complete
characterization is provided in Table C of Appendix C.
The two following conclusions emerge from the above characterization. The first
one is that in the absence of Type II players (row 4* in Table C, Appendix C) the
Schelling full segregation outcome will always emerge.
The second conclusion makes our results substantially different from the Schelling
outcome. In the presence of one Type II player the Schelling full segregation outcome
would emerge if and only if player 1 is strategic and players 2, 5 and 8 are myopic.
See row 5* in Table C, Appendix C.
Hence, the existence of strategic players may play a crucial role in the prevalence of
Schelling predictions. Moreover, the emergence of irrational players Type ¬ I and
¬ IV may alter the previous idea. Actually, both types of behaviour enhance less
segregated societies. However, this is not conclusive regarding the final configuration
as the irrational action of player i at node k could be balanced out by the actions
of subsequent players.
4.3. Results
This section is divided in three parts: first, we show the level of segregation achieved
in each society within the different treatments; second, we present the fraction of
individuals playing strategically across experiments; finally, we combine strategic
behaviour and society segregation. We will show experimental evidence for both
face-to-face and lab sessions.
4.3.1. Segregation
To explore this inquiry, we analyze the type of outcome achieved in each clock. As
noted in the previous sections our experiment provides us with 138 societies (25 for
c = 0 treatment; 60 for c = 5; and, 53 for c = 20). In Figure 4 below, we show
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the fraction of these societies that achieve a fully segregated outcome, as defined by
Schelling, that is, BBBBWWWW, as compared to the fraction where this outcome
is not achieved.
While the BBBBWWWW outcome appears in 60% of the c = 0 societies, this
fraction notably decreases to 44.07% in societies with small moving costs (c = 5),
although the difference between these two proportions is not statistically significant
(t = 1.33, p = 0.18)23. However, the fraction of fully segregated outcomes is signif-
icantly smaller (t = 1.74, p = 0.08) for societies with large moving costs (c = 20),
38.8%, as compared with societies without moving costs (c = 0). Further, this re-
sult is reinforced when we make an overall comparison of c = 0 vs. c > 0. We also
obtain a significant reduction (t = 1.69, p = 0.09) of fully segregated outcomes in
the treatment with moving costs as compared to the costless treatment.
Figure 4: Fraction (%) of BBBBWWWW outcomes across treatments.
Now we compare the results shown in Figure 4 with those we found in the lab
replications explained in Table 2:
• c = 0: 76.0% full segregation (19 out of 25 societies)
• c = 5: 53.3% full segregation (32 out of 60 societies)
• c = 20: 35% full segregation (21 out of 30 societies)
Lab results go in parallel to the face-to-face game: without costs the emergence of
Scheling output is huge24 while under positive costs the BBBBWWWW outcome
23Non parametric tests report identical results.
24The 76% full segregation for zero costs is statistically different to 53.3% (p − value = 0.052),
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becomes less likely to emerge.25 We find a negative relationship between the size
of moving costs and the share of segregated outcomes, although it is not always
statistically significant.
All in all, we summarize the findings shown along this subsection as follows:
Result 1: Under positive moving costs, the BBBBWWWW outcome is (significantly)
less likely to emerge.
What we learn from this result is that Schelling prediction is very powerful for
costless environments but it is less precise for situations where moving costs are
relevant. In fact, what Result 1 says is that full segregation is less likely to emerge
in societies where moving is costly. Today, in most of the cities around the word,
moving is extremely costly and time consuming. Although our experiment is just a
“small and artificial” replication of the real world it is also true that our results show,
in a certain way, what we see all around the world: segregated and not segregated
cities.
Result 1 talks about segregation, that is, about aggregated behaviour. The next
subsection is devoted to study how subjects behave individually.
4.3.2. The emergence of strategic players
Once we have checked that Schelling’s outcome is less likely to emerge in costly
moving societies (Result 1), we turn to analyze how moving costs affect individual
behaviour. In fact, only under costly environments can we assess the appearance of
strategic behaviour.
Using the information provided by each clock, we compute, for all empirical histo-
ries,26 those cases where unhappy subjects face the dilemma either “to stay” or “to
move”, when the situation is not trivial (Type II, unhappy-strategic versus Type
III, unhappy-myopic, see definitions in page 20). More specifically, after the actions
played by the previous individuals, each unhappy agent calculates her best response
before taking any action. There are two possibilities, either the best response is “to
move” or “to stay”. If the best response is “to move”, this implies that the unhappy
and to 35% (p − value = 0.001). Further, the 53.3% of fully segregated outcomes is statistically
different to 35% (p− value = 0.044).
25As the face-to-face experiment, when we make an overall comparison of c = 0 vs. c > 0 we get
a significant reduction (t = 1.64, p = 0.10)
26All the empirical histories we obtain in the experiment are reported in Appendix B. In each
history we underline who behaves strategically and who deviates from such behaviour.
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agent anticipates the best actions of subsequent players, and only if she moves will
she finish in a happy configuration. Nevertheless, if she computes the best response
of the remaining players and she finishes in a happy configuration even if she does
not move, then, “to stay” becomes her best response since she does not need to give
up her initial endowment (5 or 20 Euros). However, we do not find this feature in
the 0 cost setting since subjects are indifferent between both actions.
We should point out that although we have 904 observations (see last column of
Table 1) only 320 of them are informative about the type of behaviour we are
interested in (either myopic or strategic).27
Along the c > 0 treatments we are able to find 128 strategic movements (Type II).
Figure 5 shows the presence of strategic players across the 113 societies we obtained
(60+53). The x-axis represents the proportion of Type II players (0, 1, 2 or 3+)
among the 8 participants of a clock.28
Figure 5: Distribution of strategic players across societies
The results in Figure 5 show the striking result that only 29.20% of the societies
are completely free of strategic players. In other words, in most of the outcomes
(70.80%) we observe at least one player behaving strategically. In fact, in one third
27As we have already mentioned, we are unable to confirm strategic behaviour for Type I and
Type IV, see Table 3.
28Recall that it is impossible to have more than 4 Type II players.
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of the societies there are 2 or more individuals who do not behave according to
Schelling myopic rule.
It is also necessary to analyse what occurs in the lab, where anonymity is preserved.
We do find quite similar results in the lab than in the face-to-face. Specifically:
• 30.83% of the societies have 0 strategic players vs. 29.20% in Figure 5,
• 35.0% of the societies have 1 strategic player vs. 40.71% in Figure 5,
• 21.67% of the societies have 2 strategic players vs. 19.47% in Figure 5,
• 12.5% of the societies have 3+ strategic players vs. 10.62% in Figure 5.
Therefore it is reasonable to say that the face-to-face experiment gives the same
results as the computerized one. Therefore we may conclude that,
Result 2: Under positive moving costs, the majority of the societies has at least one
strategic player.
Result 2 indicates that the existence of positive costs make subjects more aware of
playing strategically. We get this result both in the face-to-face (70.80%) and lab
experiments (69.17%).
As a final remark we want to emphasize what we can learn from our experimental
setting. We can check if a experimental subject fails at least once playing myopi-
cally. It is also true that subjects who play myopically in our experiment (given
the position, history, etc.) might play strategically in other environments. In sum,
we can say that the number of strategic players we are able to uncover is a lower
bound.
4.3.3. Strategic behaviour and segregation
Our theoretical model indicates that just one strategic player might be enough
to reverse the Schelling output. Our experimental data show that: i) Schelling
configuration is not always achieved (see Result 1); and, ii) Strategic behaviour is
not rare but, on the contrary, quite abundant in the treatments with moving costs
(see Result 2).
Now, we check if Schelling’s prediction is related to the number of strategic players
within a particular society. We now combine societal segregation across treatments
and individual behaviour, that is, we explore whether the final level of segrega-
tion achieved in each clock depends on the number of strategic players within that
clock.
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Our results indicate that the emergence of strategic players substantially changes
the final segregation outcome achieved. Figure 6 shows the proportion of 0, 1, 2
and 3+ strategic players among those societies achieving full segregation, i.e., the
BBBBWWWW outcome.29
Figure 6: Proportion of societies with strategic players and BBBBWWWW configuration
Figure 6 indicates that in the absence of strategic players the complete segregation
outcome is reached in almost 69.70% of the cases. One single strategic player de-
creases this fraction to 52.70%. Finally, having 2 or more strategic players eliminates
the possibility of a fully segregated society. Hence, the Schelling fully segregated
outcome seems to be significant and negatively related with the existence of Type II
(unhappy-strategic) players within a clock. The proportion of full segregated config-
urations with 1, 2 or 3+ strategic players is significantly smaller than that without
strategic players (t=3.89 and a p-value of 0.0001).30
The lab replication shows similar results but not identical. In fact, the proportion
of societies with the fully segregated outcome when the number of strategic player
is 0, 1, 2 and 3+ is 58.18%, 46.52%, 27.77% and 17.85%, respectively.
Hence, like in Figure 6, there is a negative relationship between the number of strate-
29Recall that the analysis is restricted to treatments with moving costs.
30The difference between 69.70% and 52.70% is only significant at a 11.6%. The difference
between 69.70% and 0% (when we have 2 and 3+ strategic players) is significant at any level.
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gic players and the likehood of full-segregated societies. However, we do not find
support for the idea that a certain number of strategic players denies the existence
of BBBBWWWW configurations.
These results can be summarized as:
Result 3: The full segregated outcome vanishes as the number of strategic players in-
creases.
As shown in figure 5, we only had 30% of societies with none strategic player, there-
fore we can conclude that the Schelling prediction of full segregation significantly
gets reduced in environments with moving costs.
4.4. Discussion of the experimental results
Using an experiment in a simplified environment, this paper shows that not all
subjects play myopically when there are moving costs associated to their decisions
of moving but, in contrast, a relevant fraction of them anticipate what the other
subjects are going to do. This type of strategic behaviour was not considered in
the most general model of spatial segregation, the model proposed by Thomas C.
Schelling (1971). Recall that it is the cost of traveling what makes the critical
distinction between myopic individuals and those who are not.
But the crucial result is not the emergence of this type of behaviour per se but
how the presence of this type of players alters the final outcome achieved in this
artificial society: the higher the presence of them the smaller the probability of a
fully segregated society. However, it is important to mention that the Schelling
outcome appears in a significant number of cases.
In other words, our experiment shows that subjects respond to incentives but not all
of them respond in an analogous way. In parallel, the emergence of strategic players
has consequences on the final outcome, but once again, the resulting societies are
not always equally distributed.
In summary, our results indicate that individuals react in different ways and that
heterogeneous individuals can reach both segregated environments and not segre-
gated ones.
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5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The relevance of this paper is twofold. First, we provide an extension of the Schelling
linear model where subjects face costly decisions and, as a consequence, strategic
playing emerges. We show that this variation affects the basic result of the model
by moving from full segregation to clustering. Second, we experimentally test the
prediction of the original Schelling model and the extended model we propose. That
is, we develop a geographical experimental setup where we check whether experi-
mental subjects play according to the predicted Schelling myopic behaviour or, in
sharp contrast, they decide as strategic players.
This paper contains certain features that support the development of an interesting
research agenda. The most obvious example is that we provide a new experimental
setup to explore the role of locational issues on strategic behaviour. Given that
subjects learn easily how to play in this environment, the emergence of strategic
behaviour is not rare. Moreover, we find that visual experimental setups make
subjects more aware of their rivals’ strategic playing.
We must recall that considering different types of behaviour was one of the main
reasons why we undertook this study. Specifically, we were interested in exploring
how differences among players may have an effect on economic outcomes. Our
simplified representation of the society is useful in analyzing how subjects play
these “sorted games”.31 We plan to extend our research agenda to improve the
applicability of our work, including ethnic segregation with income differentiation.
In the same vein, and in line with some works in public policy, we are working
on Schelling dynamic models with taxation concerning situations where the state
designs policies to achieve more desirable configurations.
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6. Appendix A
First, let’s formally describe the sequential game denoted by Γn = (N = {1, 2, . . . , N}, Ai =
{i, i¯}i∈N, {K}1,...,∑Ni=0 2i , {Z}2N−1,...,2N−1, ui :
∏N
i=1 Ai → R) where
• N = {1, 2, . . . , N} is the set of players.
• Ai = {i, i¯} is the set of actions for each player such that i means that player
i stays at her initial location and i¯ that player i moves to the nearest space
with someone of her same type.
• K is the set of nodes and Z is the set of terminal nodes. Notice that all nodes
in K − Z are information sets for only one player.
• The map i : H = K − Z → {1, 2, . . . , N} where I(k) = i such that ∑i−1j=0 2j ≤
k ≤∑ij=0 2j − 1 determines the agent playing at this node.
• The set of terminal nodes Z = {∑N−1j=0 2j + 1, . . . ,∑Nj=0 2j} where payoffs
{ui}i∈N are realized.
Then, for each s in K−Z an equilibrium strategy should specify the best action for
player i(s) who plays at s. Let us fix hs ∈ A1 × . . . × Ai(s)−1 as the unique history
from the root node reaching s and denote by Γnhs the subgame starting at s.
The payoff for player i depends on her action and the final configuration reached
after all players have played. If her action was to stay and at the end of game the
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number of her neighbours like her is at least m then she gets M +C. Otherwise she
only gets C. If her action was to move and she reached a position with at least m
neighbours like her then her payoff is M . Otherwise, she will obtain 0. Notice that
she will never be indifferent between both actions, to move and to stay. Therefore
the property of no indifference holds. In other words, Γn is a finite generic extensive
game. Consider any possible initial configuration of n individuals of type 0 or 1.
This configuration can be viewed as a sequence in {0, 1}n. Next theorem asserts the
existence and unicity of a SPE for Γn independent of the initial condition. Moreover
the explicit equilibrium strategy for n = 8, d = m = 1 and the initial configuration
{B,W,B,W,B,W,B,W} is provided.
Theorem 1. • There exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the exten-
sive game Γn.
• For d = m = 1 and the initial configuration {B,W,B,W,B,W,B,W}, the
final configuration {B,B,W,W,B,B,W,W} is the consequence of the unique
equilibrium path (1, 2, 3, 4¯, 5, 6, 7, 8¯).
Proof. i) The existence of a pure Nash equilibrium of the extensive game Γn is a
consequence of Zermelo’s Theorem since Γn is a finite game. Moreover by Osborne
and Rubinstein (1996), page 100, this game verifies the non indifference property
for any two terminal nodes. Therefore, all the SPE are equivalent in payoffs. As the
game is generic then the result holds.
Recall that d ≥ m. If the number of players of each type is at least m + 1 then
the final society is always happy for any initial configuration. This is so since there
exist at least a path over the 2n possible paths of actions of the extensive game with
a cluster of these m + 1 players one after the other. Each player has m neighbours
like her in a neighbourhood of ratio d.
The existence of a pure Nash equilibrium of the extensive game associated to the
initial configuration {B,W,B,W,B,W,B,W} holds since it is a particular case of
the above case. At node s of the extensive game, a player, say is, will play her best
response given history hs and considering that the rest of the players will play their
best response. Therefore, in order to describe the best strategy for each player, we
distinguish two sets of histories: those in which player is is already happy and those
that do not verify the happiness condition. Notice that for the first set of histories,
the best response for player is is always “to stay” since her payoff is M +C greater
than M .
1. The analysis starts with the last player; player 8.
(a) The histories of length 7 where player 8 is happy are:
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• h(s) = (∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, 6¯, ∗)
• h(s) = (∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, 5, 6, 7¯)
• h(s) = (1¯, 2, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗)
where the symbol ∗ denotes any possible strategy for the player who has
to play at this position. As we already noted, her best-response is “to
stay” 8.
(b) Consider now the histories where player 8 is unhappy:
• h(s) = (1¯, 2¯, ∗, ∗, ∗, 6, 7)
• h(s) = (1, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, 6, 7).
• h(s) = (1¯, 2¯, ∗, ∗, 5¯, 6, 7¯)
In all these cases, as player 8 is the last player, her best response is “to
move” 8¯.
2. To compute the strategy of player 7, we take into account both the history
and the best reply of player 8 given the two possible actions of player 7.
(a) Player 7 is happy in the following cases:
• h(s) = (∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, 5¯, ∗)
• h(s) = (∗, ∗, ∗, 4, 5, 6¯)
Her best response is “to stay” 7.
(b) Player 7 is unhappy if her history is (∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, 5, 6). As the action “to
stay” is dominant over the action “to move”, we check if “to stay” is her
best response given the corresponding best response of player 8:
• The two following histories h(s) = (1¯, 2¯, ∗, ∗, 5, 6) and h(s) = (1, ∗, ∗, ∗, 5, 6)
have in common that for action 7, the best response for player 8 is
“to move”. Consequently, at the final configuration, player 7 be-
comes happy given the best response of player 8. Therefore, in those
cases, the best response for player 7 is “to stay”, 7.
• Nevertheless, the history h(s) = (1¯, 2, ∗, ∗, ∗, 6) with action 7 presents
a path for player 8 within a best response of 8. Therefore player 7
has to move in order to end up with at least one neighbour like her.
We conclude that her best response is 7¯.
To summarize, depending on the action of player 1 and 2, the path generated
by the best responses of players 7 and 8 is either (7, 8¯) or (7¯, 8).
3. Following the same argument as before, the best response for player 6 de-
pends on her history of length 5 and the actions that player 7 and 8 will play
afterwards.
(a) Player 6 is happy if:
• h(s) = (∗, ∗, ∗, 4¯, ∗)
• h(s) = (∗, ∗, 3, 4, 5¯)
thus her best response is “to stay”, 6.
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(b) Player 6 is unhappy in the following histories of length 5:
• h(s) = (1¯, 2, ∗, 4, 5). In this situation, player 8 is happy since player
1 moved. Using the conclusion obtained above for players 8 and 7,
player 6 anticipates their best response (7¯, 8). Therefore, giving the
movement of player 7, the best response for player 6 will be “to stay”,
6.
• h(s) = (1¯, 2, 3¯, 4, 5¯). As in the above case, we can conclude that she
will decide “to stay”, 6.
• h(s) = (1, ∗, ∗, 4, 5), (1¯, 2¯, ∗, 4, 5), h(s) = (1, ∗, 3¯, 4, 5¯) and h(s) =
(1¯, 2¯, 3¯, 4, 5¯). In all these cases, player 8 is unhappy. Now player 6
anticipates that player 7 and 8 will play (7, 8¯). Consequently, player
6 has “to move” to end up with at least one neighbour like her.
As a consequence, depending on the action of player 1, “to stay” or “to move”,
the path generated by the best response of players 6, 7 and 8 are (6¯, 7, 8) and
(6, 7¯, 8), respectively.
4. The history of length 4 and the best strategies for players 6, 7 and 8 dictate
the best answer for player 5.
(a) If 5 is happy, the histories of length 4 are:
• h(s) = (∗, ∗, 3¯, ∗)
• h(s) = (∗, 2, 3, 4¯)
with her best response being “to stay”, 5.
(b) If 5 is unhappy, we consider:
• h(s) = (1¯, 2, 3, 4) where player 5 will anticipate the action profile
(6, 7¯, 8). Hence her best response is “to move”, 5¯.
• h(s) = (1¯, 2¯, 3, 4¯), h(s) = (1, 2¯, 3, 4¯) have in common that player 8
is not happy. Therefore player 5 anticipates (6¯, 7, 8) and plays “to
stay”, 5, as her best response.
Hence the actions of players 1 and 2 condition the action of player 8 (either “to
stay” or “to move”) and the paths generated by the best response of players
5, 6, 7 and 8 are (5, 6¯, 7, 8) or (5¯, 6, 7¯, 8), respectively.
5. Following the same process, player 4 considers:
(a) If 4 is happy, the histories of length 3 are:
• h(s) = (∗, 2¯, ∗)
• h(s) = (1, 2, 3¯)
then her best response is “to stay”, 4
(b) If 4 is unhappy, then the histories corresponding to such a situation are:
• h(s) = (1¯, 2, 3) where player 4 anticipates (5¯, 6, 7, 8) and her best
response is “to stay”, 4.
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• h(s) = (1, 2, 3) where player 8 is not happy and therefore player 4
anticipates (5, 6¯, 7, 8), being her best response “to move”, 4¯.
• h(s) = (1¯, 2, 3¯) where player 8 and player 5 are both happy. Follow-
ing the subgame perfection equilibrium path of the corresponding
subtree, player 4 anticipates (5, 6, 7¯, 8). Her best response is then “to
move”, 4¯.
In any situation where player 4 is not happy, she has to move generating the
path (4¯, 5, 6, 7, 8¯).
6. The case for player 3 is the following:
(a) If 3 is happy, the histories of length 2 are:
• h(s) = (1¯, ∗)
• h(s) = (1, 2¯)
then her best response is “to stay”, 3.
(b) If 3 is unhappy, then the unique history to be considered is:
• h(s) = (1, 2) where player 3 will anticipate (4¯, 5, 6, 7, 8¯). Thus her
best response is “to stay”, 3.
Therefore, the best response for player 3 in any situation is “to stay”, 3.
7. For the case of player 2, we have only two histories:
(a) If 2 is happy:
• h(s) = (1¯)
then her best response is “to stay”, 2.
(b) If 2 is unhappy, then the unique history to consider is:
• h(s) = (1) where player 2 anticipates (3, 4¯, 5, 6, 7, 8¯), thus her best
response is “to stay”, 2, because player 8 will move to the space close
to her.
The above situation therefore means that the best reply for player 2 is “to
stay”, 2.
8. The last case corresponds to player 1 with only one case:
(a) 1 is unhappy at the initial state so she will anticipate (2, 3, 4¯, 5, 6, 7, 8¯).
Her best response is “to stay”, 1, because player 8 will move to the space.
Given the above situation, the best reply for player 1 is “to stay”, 1.
The unique equilibrium path of Γ is (1, 2, 3, 4¯, 5, 6, 7, 8¯) with a final circle configura-
tion of players 18235467 generating a society of BWWBBWWB. Hence the result
holds.
7. Appendix B
This appendix is devoted to studying some particular paths generated by the sub-
game best response after a specific history. Specifically, the extensive game has many
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paths that do not verify the subgame perfect criterion. Any of them establishes at
least one player who plays off the equilibrium path, that is, players who are not Type
II. Nevertheless, these choices may reach either a happy society where all players end
up with at least a neighbour like them or not. The goal of the following discussion
is to study those cases that arise in our experimental data by characterizing player
types.
Let us start with the second row of Table B in this Appendix, (1¯, 2, 3, 4, 5¯, 6, 7, 8).
This configuration appears in our empirical data with a frequency of 3.33%. The
lemma below states the SPE of the subgame after the action of player 1. In the
particular case where player 1 is Type III, the generated tree denoted by Γ1¯ can be
solved for the remaining players using the subgame perfect criterion. This allows us
to determine each player’s type in the path obtained.
Lemma 2. If player 1 plays 1¯, then the SPE for Γ1¯ is (2, 3, 4, 5¯, 6, 7, 8). The corre-
sponding output society is BBWWBBWW.
Proof. As player 1 moves, player 8, 2 and 3 become happy. We can conclude that
the best response for all of them is “to stay”. Let us check what is the best response
for players 4, 5, 6 and 7.
Player 4 will react against the history of length 3: (1¯, 2, 3). By the proof of the main
theorem, we know that player 4 will anticipate the action profile for players 5, 6,
7 and 8: (5¯, 6, 7, 8). Therefore, her best response is “to stay”, 4. The final output
configuration is obtained by the path (1¯, 2, 3, 4, 5¯, 6, 7, 8), thus generating the society
BBWWBBWW .
Given the above lemma, we can conclude that player 1 is Type III and player 4 is
Type II. Nevertheless, given that the remaining players are Type I, we are not able
to distinguish between strategic behaviour and myopic behaviour.
Consider now the following path: (1, 2¯, 3, 4, 5, 6¯, 7, 8). This path corresponds to the
fourth row in Table B. In this case, player 1 is of Type II, but player 2 is of Type
III. The next lemma states the subgame path of the corresponding subtree after the
history (1, 2¯).
Lemma 3. If player 1 plays 1 and player 2 plays 2¯, then the SPE for Γ1,2¯ is
(3, 4, 5, 6¯, 7, 8).
Proof. After the action of player 2, both player 3 and player 4 become happy.
Following the proof of the main result, we can check that if player 5 decides “to
stay” it is because she anticipates the best responses of players 6, 7, and 8: (6¯, 7, 8).
With this path, player 5 becomes happy and thus her best response is “to stay”.
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In this case, player 5 plays 5 even when she is not happy after her history h5 =
(1, 2¯, 3, 4). This yields Type II behaviour for player 5. The final configuration of the
final society is BBWWBBWW .
The last lemma in this section presents a variation of types and the consequent best
response for an information node of a Type III player. This case is shown in the
third row of Table B in this Appendix.
Fix the action of player 1, 1¯. By lemma 2, the corresponding subgame perfect path
of the subtree Γ1¯ is (2, 3, 4, 5¯, 6, 7, 8). In this case, player 4 is of Type II. What is
the best response if player 4 were actually of Type III?
Lemma 4. If players 1, 2, 3 and 4 play (1¯, 2, 3, 4¯), the SPE for Γ(1¯,2,3,4¯) is (5, 6, 7¯, 8).
Proof. Notice that player 8 is happy given the action of player 1. Moreover, as
player 4 is of Type III, she makes players 5 and 6 happy. Player 7 is therefore the
last unhappy player. Following the proof of the main result, we can conclude that
her best response is “to move”.
In the above case, there are no Type II individuals. Moreover, a Type IV indi-
vidual appears: player 7. The final configuration is not a happy configuration:
WBBWWWBB.
The following table shows the rest of the empirical cases32 in our experiment. The
first column shows the path. The second one gives the players who deviate from the
equilibrium path, i.e., Types III, ¬ I and ¬ IV. The third column enumerates the
players engaging in strategic behaviour (Type II), while the last column presents
the final configuration of the society.
32A non-rational deviation could be any movement after an immediate movement of your neigh-
bour. Then, any path with two consecutive movements is not an equilibrium path and is not a
best response for the last player. As we find some of these cases in our data, we study them one
by one.
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Play TypesIII,¬I,¬IV TypeII Outcome
(1, 2, 3, 4¯, 5, 6, 7, 8¯) 1, 2, 3, 7 BBWWBBWW
(1¯, 2, 3, 4, 5¯, 6, 7, 8) 1 4 BBWWBBWW
(1¯, 2, 3, 4¯, 5, 6, 7¯, 8) 1, 4 BBBBWWWW
(1, 2¯, 3, 4, 5, 6¯, 7, 8) 2 1, 5 BBWWBBWW
(1, 2¯, 3, 4, 5¯, 6, 7, 8¯) 2, 5 1 BBBBWWWW
(1, 2, 3¯, 4, 5, 6¯, 7, 8) 3 1, 2 BWWBBBWW
(1, 2, 3, 4¯, 5, 6, 7¯, 8) 7 1, 2, 3 BBWBBWWW
(1¯, 2¯, 3, 4, 5, 6¯, 7, 8) 1, 2 5 BBWWBBWW
(1¯, 2¯, 3, 4, 5¯, 6, 7, 8¯) 1, 2, 5 BBBBWWWW
(1¯, 2¯, 3, 4, 5¯, 6¯, 7, 8) 1, 2, 5, 6 BBWWBBWW
(1, 2, 3¯, 4, 5, 6¯, 7¯, 8) 3, 7 1, 2 BWWBBWWB
(1, 2, 3¯, 4¯, 5, 6, 7, 8¯) 3, 4 1, 2, 7 BBWWBBWW
(1, 2, 3¯, 4¯, 5, 6, 7¯, 8) 3, 4, 7 1, 2 WWBWWBBB
(1, 2, 3¯, 4¯, 5, 6, 7¯, 8¯) 3, 4, 7, 8 1, 2 WWBBWWBB
(1¯, 2, 3, 4¯, 5¯, 6, 7¯, 8) 1, 4, 5 BBWWBBWW
(1, 2¯, 3, 4, 5¯, 6¯, 7, 8) 2, 5, 6 1 BBWWBBWW
(1, 2¯, 3¯, 4, 5, 6¯, 7, 8) 2, 3 1 BBWWBBWW
(1, 2¯, 3, 4, 5¯, 6, 7¯, 8) 2, 3, 6, 7 1 BBWWBBWW
(1¯, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7¯, 8) 1, 5 4, 6 BBWBWWWB
(1¯, 2, 3, 4¯, 5, 6¯, 7, 8) 1, 4, 6 BBBWBWWW
(1¯, 2, 3, 4¯, 5, 6, 7, 8) 1, 4, 7 BBBWWBWW
(1¯, 2, 3, 4, 5¯, 6, 7¯, 8) 1, 7 4 BBWWBWWB
(1¯, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6¯, 7, 8) 1, 5, 6 4 BBWBBWWW
(1¯, 2, 3, 4¯, 5¯, 6, 7, 8) 1, 4, 5 BBWWBBWW
(1¯, 2, 3¯, 4¯, 5, 6, 7¯, 8) 1, 3, 4 BBBBWWWW
(1¯, 2¯, 3, 4, 5¯, 6, 7, 8) 1, 2, 5 BBWWWBBW
(1¯, 2¯, 3¯, 4, 5, 6¯, 7, 8) 1, 2, 3 BBWWWBBW
(1, 2¯, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8¯) 2, 6 1, 5, 7 BBWWBWWB
(1, 2¯, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7¯, 8) 2, 6, 7 1 BBWWBWWB
(1, 2¯, 3, 4, 5¯, 6, 7, 8) 2, 5, 8 1 BBWWWBBW
(1, 2¯, 3, 4¯, 5, 6, 7, 8¯) 2, 4 1, 7 BBWWBWWB
(1, 2¯, 3, 4¯, 5, 6, 7¯, 8) 2, 4, 7 1, 7 BBWBWWWB
(1, 2¯, 3, 4, 5¯, 6, 7¯, 8¯) 2, 5, 7, 8 1 BBBBWWWW
(1, 2¯, 3, 4¯, 5¯, 6, 7, 8¯) 2, 4, 5 1 BBBBWWWW
(1, 2¯, 3¯, 4, 5, 6¯, 7, 8) 2, 3 1 BWWBBBWW
(1, 2¯, 3¯, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8¯) 2, 3, 6 1, 7 BWWWBBWB
(1, 2¯, 3¯, 4, 5, 6, 7¯, 8) 2, 3, 6, 7 1 BWWBBWWB
(1, 2¯, 3¯, 4, 5, 6¯, 7¯, 8) 2, 3, 7 1 BBWWBBWW
(1, 2, 3¯, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8¯) 3, 6 1, 2, 7 BBWWWBBW
(1, 2, 3¯, 4, 5, 6, 7¯, 8) 3, 6, 7 1, 2 BWWBBWWB
(1, 2, 3¯, 4, 5, 6, 7¯, 8¯) 3, 6, 7, 8 1, 2 BWWWBBWB
(1, 2, 3¯, 4, 5¯, 6¯, 7, 8) 3, 5 1, 2 BWWBBBWW
(1, 2, 3¯, 4, 5¯, 6, 7, 8¯) 3, 5, 6 1, 2 BBBWBWWW
(1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6¯, 7, 8) 4 1, 2, 3, 5 BWBWBBWW
(1, 2, 3, 4, 5¯, 6, 7, 8¯) 4, 5 1, 2, 3 BWWBWWBB
(1, 2, 3, 4, 5¯, 6, 7, 8) 4, 5, 8 1, 2, 3 BWBWWBBW
Table B
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8. Appendix C
Player History InitialConfiguration Action BestResponse FinalConfiguration
1 0 BWBWBWBW 1 (2, 3, 4¯, 5, 6, 7, 8¯) BBWWBBWW
1 0 BWBWBWBW 1¯ (2, 3, 4, 5¯, 6, 7, 8) BBWWBBWW
2 1 BWBWBWBW 2 (3, 4¯, 5, 6, 7, 8¯) BBWWBBWW
2 1 BWBWBWBW 2¯ (3, 4, 5, 6¯, 7, 8)) BBWWBBWW
3 (1, 2) BWBWBWBW 3 (4¯, 5, 6, 7, 8¯) BBWWBBWW
3 (1, 2) BWBWBWBW 3¯ (4, 5, 6¯, 7, 8)) BWWBBBWW
4 (1¯, 2, 3) WBBWBWBW 4 (5¯, 6, 7, 8)) WBBWWBBW
4∗ (1¯, 2, 3) WBBWBWBW 4¯ (5, 6, 7¯, 8) BBBBWWWW
5 (1, 2¯, 3, 4) BBWWBWBW 5 (6¯, 7, 8) BBWWBBWW
5∗ (1, 2¯, 3, 4) BBWWBWBW 5¯ (6, 7, 8¯) BBWWWWBB
5 (1¯, 2¯, 3, 4) BBWWBWBW 5 (6¯, 7, 8) BBWWBBWW
5∗ (1¯, 2¯, 3, 4) BBWWBWBW 5¯ (6, 7, 8¯) BBWWWWBB
5 (1, 2, 3, 4) BWBWBWBW 5 (6¯, 7, 8) BWBWBBWW
5 (1, 2, 3, 4) BWBWBWBW 5¯ (6, 7, 8¯) BWWBWWBB
6 (1¯, 2, 3, 4, 5) WBBWBWBW 6 (7¯, 8) WBBBWBWW
6 (1¯, 2, 3, 4, 5) WBBWBWBW 6¯ (7, 8) WBBWBBWW
6 (1¯, 2, 3¯, 4, 5) WBWBBWBW 6 (7¯, 8) WBBWBBWW
6∗ (1¯, 2, 3¯, 4, 5) WBWBBWBW 6¯ (7, 8) WBWBBBWW
7 (1, 2¯, 3, 4, 5, 6) BBWWBWBW 7 8¯ BBWWWBWB
7 (1, 2¯, 3, 4, 5, 6) BBWWBWBW 7¯ 8 BBWWBWWB
7 (1, 2¯, 3, 4¯, 5, 6) BBWBWWBW 7 8¯ BBWWBWWB
7 (1, 2¯, 3, 4¯, 5, 6) BBWBWWBW 7¯ 8 BBWBWWWB
7 (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) BWBWBWBW 7 8¯ BWWBWBWB
7 (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) BWBWBWBW 7¯ 8 BWBWBWWB
7 (1, 2, 3¯, 4, 5, 6) BWWBBWBW 7 8¯ BWWBWBWB
7 (1, 2, 3¯, 4, 5, 6) BWWBBWBW 7¯ 8 BWBWBWWB
7 (1, 2, 3, 4¯, 5, 6) BWBBWWBW 7 8¯ BWWBBWWB
7 (1, 2, 3, 4¯, 5, 6) BWBBWWBW 7¯ 8 BWBBWWWB
Table C
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